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This paper considers a simple model of asymmetric conflict, between an incum-
bent, e.g. government or dominant firm, and potential challengers, e.g. guerrillas or
entrants. It is not uncommon for challengers to win such conflicts despite their lack of
resources. One way they can do this by exploiting a second mover advantage: choosing
to attack the incumbent in ways that it had not prepared for, because it was locked in
by past investments. To model such asymmetric conflict we use a three stage game.
In the first stage the incumbent chooses effort; in the second stage the challengers
choose the degree of differentiation from the incumbent and in the third stage each
decide whether to attack or defend and collect their payoffs. Although the game is
simple, the calculations required from the players are difficult and shed light on the
complexities of many conflicts.
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1 Introduction
Conflict is endemic in social and economic interaction. In addition to the obvious case
of military combat, legal disputes, and commercial battles to establish market share or
standards all involve conflicts between agents and all have been the focus of economic
analysis. Economic models of conflict, generally treat agents as allocating resources (e.g.
military expenditures, legal fees, advertising or R&D budgets) to conflict as well as to
productive activities, e.g. Hirschleifer (2001), Grossman (1991), and Grossman and Kim
(1995). The relative investments of the antagonists then determines their probability of
winning through a ‘conflict success function’, CSF. Like Voltaire, most CSFs assume that
God is on the side of the big battalions, in the sense that those who invest most are likely
to win. However, in real life, like Hollywood movies, the little guys win more often than
one might expect, for example Japan beating Russia in 1905-6, Germany beating larger
French and British forces in 1940 and Vietnam beating the US in the 1970s. Indeed,
using a large sample of battles, Rotte and Schmidt (2003) show that relative force size is
a poor predictor of victory. Instead, much quantitative analysis suggests that the strategy
adopted is the most important determinant of victory in war, Reiter (1999). On the basis of
a quantitative analysis Arreguin-Toft (2001) concludes that ’strong actors lose asymmetric
conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-a-vis their weaker adversaries.’
It is often the case that a dominant incumbent is beaten by smaller challengers, be-
cause the challengers fight in ways the incumbent was unprepared for, being locked in to
a particular way of fighting. Currently, the military call this asymmetric warfare, though
attacking in ways that your opponent was unprepared for has in fact been standard in
military thought since at least Sun Tzu in the fourth century BC (Newman, 2000). The
current US concern arises because its focus on standard warfare, in which it is dominant,
tends to give its adversaries an incentive to differentiate, in the sense of adopting idio-
syncratic technologies or tactics. Again there are historical precedents. Clearly, the US
were differentiated from their Vietnamese opponents in level of resources available, level
of military technology, type of warfare (conventional or guerrilla), and in perceived costs
of conflict (the Vietnamese were willing to take much larger casualties than the US). Also,
as Enders and Sandler (1993, 2004) and Sandler and Arce (2003) note, when terrorists
have a choice of targets (e.g. different countries or different objectives within the same
country) effort being put into defending one target will provide incentives for the terror-
ists to differentiate, to substitute alternative targets. For example, in response to British
counter-terrorism efforts, the IRA switched from attacking military targets in Northern
Ireland, firstly to civilian targets in Britain, and then to high value commercial targets in
the City of London.
There are also many commercial examples of powerful incumbents being displaced by
small challengers. The large US automobile companies lost their dominant market share
to small importers against whom they could not compete, Abernathy (1978) provides a
classic analysis of the lock-in dilemma they faced, leaving their challengers a second-mover
advantage. IBM was the dominant player in the computing industry, with a particular way
of doing business and a well established customer base1, but small challengers, Intel and
Microsoft, displaced IBM as monopolists (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; Sutton, 2001).
Microsoft’s tactics for displacing software incumbents are discussed in Liebowitz and Mar-
golis (1999). Now, Microsoft and Intel are the incumbents, currently vulnerable to small
challengers, such as Open Source Linux and different types of processors. Non-economists
have an obvious explanation of such phenomena: the ignorance and incompetence of the
incumbents and there is a large literature on military incompetence and how the igno-
rance and megalomania of chief executives destroys their firms. Economists, while averse
to explanations based on ignorance and incompetence, tend to lack alternatives.
This paper presents a simple model that captures how in response to incumbent in-
vestment, challengers differentiate in order to reduce the value of that investment, thus
giving the challengers a chance of winning; even when the powerful incumbent is neither
ignorant nor incompetent. There is a prize, peace in Iraq or market dominance, which can
be achieved by a three stage game. In Stage 1, the incumbent decides how much effort
to invest to counter the threat and becomes locked into that investment. In Stage 2, the
challengers, who are resource constrained and whose effort is given, decide how much to
differentiate from the incumbent. Finally, in stage 3, incumbent and challengers simulta-
neously decide whether to attack or defend. The probabilities of winning depend on the
attack/defend decisions of the two parties, their efforts and the degree of differentiation.
Differentiation benefits an attacker but disadvantages a defender, thus acts like a commit-
1A related reason for lock-in, discussed in Chen (2000), is the fear that innovation may cannibalise
existing businesses, which was important in the case of IBM.
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ment technology to the challengers. There are costs of conflict, since if either attack some
of the contested resources are destroyed in the resulting conflict, and these costs differ by
agent and type of conflict; e.g. destruction being higher in a situation of mutual attack.
There are four possible outcomes. First, there is (hostile) peace, if both sides decide to
defend. Second, there is unprovoked attack if the incumbent attacks peaceful challengers.
We rule out this outcome by assuming that a characteristic of a dominant incumbent
is that they are satisfied with the status quo. Third, there is defensive conflict if the
incumbent defends against challengers attack. Fourth, there is mutual attack, if both
incumbent and challengers attack.
Although the game is simple, the calculations required from the players are difficult
and shed some light on the complexities of real conflicts. Being able to differentiate
increases the incentive for the challengers to attack, making the world more dangerous for
the incumbent and requiring it to expend more effort to deter attack and maintain peace.
In fact, there may be no level of incumbent effort which can maintain peace. Even if there
is a level of effort that could deter attack, it may be cheaper for the incumbent to defend
against an attack than to deter it2. In this case, defensive conflict, differentiation reduces
the effectiveness and the level of incumbent effort: military expenditure buys less security
and so less is purchased.
Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 finds the solution to the game. Section
4 introduces a fixed cost of differentiation Section 5 has some concluding comments.
2 The model
2.1 Structure of the game
Consider two parties, incumbent a, and challengers b, who are rational players of a se-
quential three stage game to gain a prize of value V . Part of the prize may be simply
surviving and the costs of conflict, introduced below, may include lives lost. We assume
that both parties are materially rather than ideologically motivated and so they fight be-
2For a monopolist the size of the sunk costs necessary to deter entrants may be very large relative to
the cost of defending their market against them. In some cases it may be worth incurring vast sunk costs,
e.g. the massive Cold War arsenals, because the costs of conflict are larger. Intriligator (1975) provides a
model.
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cause the expected value of fighting is greater than the expected value of peace. Collier
and Hoeffler (1998) provide evidence that this describes most civil wars. The three stage
game determines the incumbent’s effort, the challengers’ differentiation, the nature of the
conflict, and the payoffs.
Stage 1 : Incumbent chooses effort, ea with cost Ca (ea). Cost increases with effort and
the second derivative is such that the expected utility function is concave. The challengers
effort eb is considered fixed.
Stage 2 : Challengers choose a degree of differentiation from the incumbent, t. The
incumbent’s choice is determined by prior investments.
Stage 3 : Incumbent and challengers simultaneously decide whether to attack or defend
and get their payoffs. Since there is no way either of the parties can credibly commit to
attack or defend before the other, we assume, like much of the industrial organisation
literature, that the decision is simultaneous.
The game is solved backwards to find the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium for incumbent
effort and challengers differentiation, which will result in a unique pure strategy equilib-
rium in the third stage of the game.
This structure captures two sources of asymmetry. The first is in resource availability.
The incumbent with larger resources can allocate its budget across a range of expenditures
and so has more flexibility when it comes to choosing effort, while the challengers are re-
source constrained and devote all of their limited resources to the conflict. The second is
in ways of fighting. The incumbent is locked in by large fixed investments to a particular
way of fighting or doing business3 and while it has to prepare to be attacked from many
directions, the challengers can choose how to attack, having observed the incumbent’s
vulnerability. This ability to differentiate can make limited resources effective: The 9/11
Commission estimated that the four plane attack cost al Qaeda less than $500,000, Keen
(2004). In military writing the differentiation is often described on the attrition/maneuver
dimension. Luttwak (1987, 96-97) notes. ’Under an attritional approach, when the aim is
to secure technical advantage by the generous use of resources, the conduct of research and
development requires no particular tactical or operational focus: the goal is to obtain the
3 In the case of the US military some evidence for inertia is provided by Trajtenberg (2003) who shows
that the shares of US defence R&D expenditures across different categories have not changed since Sep-
tember 11th, 2001 with 30% of R&D expenditures still being allocated to big weapon systems.
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"best" systems, which maximise every aspect of performance, subject only to cost ceilings.
.... Under a relational-maneuver approach, by contrast, the aim of research and develop-
ment is precisely to obtain technical abilities that exploit specific enemy vulnerabilities
and are congruent with tactics and methods shaped by the same purpose.’ Like most
military literature, we do not treat ways of fighting, strategies or weapons, as inherently
offensive or defensive and separate the way of fighting from the choice to attack or defend.
Reiter (1999) discusses this issue. In our model, challengers may differentiate, then not
attack or not differentiate then attack.
2.2 Probability of winning
The contest success function, or CSF, gives the probability of winning for each party
i = a, b, as a function of their final stage choices Si, attack or defend, their efforts, ea
and eb, and the challengers’ degree of differentiation, t ≥ 0. The probability of player i
winning Pi (Sa, Sb), depends on the final stage choice of the incumbent, the first term in
parenthesis, and of the challengers, second term. Thus Pa (A,D) is the probability the
incumbent wins if it attacks and the challengers defend and Pb (D,A) is the probability
the challengers win if the incumbent defends and they attack. If neither side attacks, they














Pa (D,D) = sa. (1)
with Pb (Sa, Sb) = 1− Pa (Sa, Sb) .
Note that in the formal model the P (., .) can be treated either as probabilities or as
shares of the prize. The only difference is expected utility is replaced by utility. Both
interpretations are common in the conflict literature.
While CSFs which make the probability of success a function of the ratio of effort by
each side are common in the conflict literature, ours differ in allowing the probabilities to
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depend on the attack/defend choices of the two parties and the degree of differentiation
by the challengers.
Note that
Pb (D,A) ≥ Pb (A,A) ≥ Pb (A,D)
Pa (A,D) ≥ Pa (A,A) ≥ Pa (D,A) .
where equalities apply when there is no differentiation, since the probability of winning will
just depend on effort. Differentiation provides an advantage in attack and a disadvantage
in defence. Thus, in stage 3, if the incumbent attacks and the challengers defend, differ-
entiation benefits the incumbent; whereas if the incumbent is defending against attack by
the challengers, differentiation benefits the challengers. In a mutual attack, differentiation
cancels out and the probabilities just depend on relative effort. Differentiation acts as a
’surprise’ factor that benefits the party which is on the attack and has the opposite effect
to a defensive advantage4. Treating maneuver as an example of differentiation, this makes
defence more difficult. For example, the technology and tactics of Blitzkrieg, depending
on speed and movement, gave the Germans a substantial advantage when they were at-
tacking, but left them at a disadvantage when defending against attack by the Soviets.
Luttwak (1987, p99-106) discusses the rewards and risks of Blitzkrieg.
We assume that the status-quo, peacetime, shares of the prize si, are exogenous. In
many cases it would in fact be cheaper for the incumbent to bribe the challengers with the
promise of a larger third-stage peace-time share rather than to deter, defend or attack,
but rarely can an incumbent credibly pre-commit to do so and for commercial incumbents
it is usually illegal. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
2.3 Payoffs and the cost of conflict
The payoffs are the expected utilities of the parties, i = a, b from their final stage strategies,
attack or defend, Si = A,D. The expected utility of a party is the probability of winning,
Pi(Sa, Sb) times the shares of the prize, V, that is left after the conflict, φi (Sa, Sb) , less
4Siqueira (2002) includes a defensive advantage to capture the usual military rule of thumb that the
attacker needs a local advantage of 3 to 1, to be sure of winning. In an earlier version of the paper we
included such a defensive advantage, all the results here go through as long as the defensive advantage is
not too large.
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the cost of their effort, C(ei):
EUa(Sa, Sb) = Pa(Sa, Sb)φa (Sa, Sb)V − Ca (ea) ,
EUb(Sa, Sb) = Pb(Sa, Sb)φb (Sa, Sb)V − Cb (eb) ,
The perceived cost of conflict, 1−φi (Sa, Sb) , differs between the insurgent and challengers,
and by type of conflict. There is a large quantitative literature on how the cost of con-
flict varies with type of conflict, e.g. inter-state war, intra-state war or terrorist attack.
Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) and Tavares (2004) examine how the economic
costs of terrorist attacks are sensitive to the country’s political and economic character-
istics. Even were the two sides to agree on the consequences of conflict (destruction of
property, lives lost by each side and uninvolved civilians, economic opportunities foregone,
loss of autonomy, etc.) they would be unlikely to aggregate them in the same way, par-
ticularly where the consequences involve what Bernholz (2004) calls supreme values. A
dominant incumbent may attach a high value to their own lives and a low value to oppo-
nents lives, e.g. the US in Vietnam, whereas the challengers may attach a low value to
their own death and a high value to their opponent’s deaths, e.g. suicide bombers. Thus
perceptions of the cost of will vary. Tessler and Nachtwey (1998) examine how personal
characteristics and religion influence perceptions of the costs and benefits of conflict.
If both parties defend, there is peace, no costs of conflict are incurred and the utilities
are saV − Ca (ea) and sbV − Cb (eb). Since eb is exogenous, we measure the challengers’
payoff relative to their constant costs Cb(eb). We also normalize V = 1. Table 1 gives the
expected payoffs for the four possible outcomes.
a\b A D
A Pa (A,A)φa (A,A)−Ca, P b(A,A)φb (A,A)−Cb Pa (A,D)φa (A,D)−Ca, P b (A,D)φb (A,D)−Cb
D Pa (D,A)φa (D,A)−Ca, P b (D,A)φb (D,A)−Cb sa−Ca, sb−Cb
Table 1. Payoffs
The perceived costs of conflict are crucial because they determine the payoffs to the
strategy of each party and thus the potential equilibria. The game we are interested in
has a dominant incumbent satisfied with the status quo, scope for attack that destroys
resources and defence which reduces destruction and a dissatisfied challenger with an
incentive to attack. The assumptions which give such a game are:
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(a) the incumbent enjoys the status quo and so prefers peace to attacking unthreatening
challengers,
sa > φa(A,D);
which excludes unprovoked attack as a possible equilibrium.
(b) defence reduces the destruction of an attack, so for the incumbent more of the
prize is left under (D,A) than (A,A)
φa(D,A) > φa(A,A)
(c) similarly for the challengers
φb(D,A) > φb(A,A);
(d) the challengers may have an incentive to attack because the proportion of the prize
left after they attack is greater than their status quo share
φb(D,A) > sb.
The above assumptions allow first, an asymmetric perceived cost of conflict between
the different parties and second, a perceived cost of conflict which is sensitive to the
conflict type. Support for these assumptions can be found in recent empirical literature
on the economic costs of conflict. Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) prove although
terrorism has a negative effect on growth, this is smaller and less persistent than that
associated with external wars.
Note that assumption (a) arises both with large sa, the interpretation we emphasise,
or small φa(A,D), where the cost of attacking challengers is high, e.g. terrorists who can
melt away into the community or are located in difficult terrain. Keen (2004) describes
the difficulties the US faced in attacking Bin Laden before 9/11. This assumption aims
to capture a situation when the incumbent is pleased with the status quo whereas the
challengers are not. If the incumbent could credibly threaten unprovoked attack, the
challengers would find differentiation less attractive since it turns into a disadvantage
when they are being attacked.
Other assumptions would give other games, but these capture the case we are interested
in. We treat the perceived cost of conflict, like peace-time shares, as exogenous. Many
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attempts at external conflict resolution are designed to change such perceptions, usually
with little success; Bernholz (2004) discusses the difficulties. We return to this issue in
the conclusions.
3 The solution to the game
In this section we obtain the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game when differentiation
is possible and compare it with the case when it is not. We introduce fixed costs of
differentiation in the next section.
3.1 Last stage: simultaneous choice of defence or attack
In the last stage, effort or differentiation costs do not appear because they are sunk costs
by then. Considering the conditions for each of the four possible candidates for a Pure
Strategy Nash equilibria in the last stage, we have:
1. MUTUAL ATTACK, (A,A): For this to be an equilibrium, each party must prefer
mutual attack to defending against attack by the other: so the (A,A) payoff to the incum-
bent is greater than the (A,D) payoff and the (A,A) payoff to the challengers is greater
than the (D,A) payoff:
φb (A,A)Pb (A,A) ≥ φb (A,D)Pb (A,D)
φa (A,A)Pa (A,A) ≥ φa (D,A)Pa (D,A) (2)
2. PEACE, (D,D): For this to be an equilibrium, each party’s peacetime shares, sa
and sb, must be greater than the payoffs from attacking:
sb ≥ φb (D,A)Pb (D,A)
sa ≥ φa (A,D)Pa (A,D) (3)
3. DEFENSIVE CONFLICT, (D,A): For this to be an equilibrium, the challengers
must gain by attacking and the incumbent must gain by defending:
sb ≤ φb (D,A)Pb (D,A)
φa (D,A)Pa (D,A) ≥ φa (A,A)Pa(A,A) (4)
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4: UNPROVOKED ATTACK, (A,D): This cannot be a candidate for Nash Equilib-
rium as, by assumption (a), sa > φa(A,D).
Thus, we are left with three candidates for Nash Equilibrium in the last stage of the
game. If differentiation was not possible, then Pa(A,D) = Pa(D,A) = Pa(A,A) and
defence would be a dominant strategy for the incumbent, meaning that mutual attack
could not be an equilibrium in the final stage. With differentiation, even if assumption
(b) were to hold, mutual attack could still be an equilibrium. Attack could be the best
response for incumbents when challengers attack, because it neutralizes the advantage
that the challengers get from differentiation. However, we shall see that the challengers
will limit their differentiation to block the mutual attack equilibrium.
3.2 Stage 2: choice of differentiation by the challengers
In the second stage, the challengers choose to how much to differentiate conditional on
the incumbent’s choice of effort ea. Assumption (a) sa > φa(A,D), excludes (A,D) as an
equilibrium and we need to determine which of the other equilibria the challengers will want
to implement, through their choice of t(ea). Since Pb(A,A) < Pb(D,A) and φb(A,A) <
φb(D,A) it follows that Pb(A,A)φb(A,A) < Pb(D,A)φb(D,A), and so challengers will
prefer (D,A) to (A,A). Since differentiation is assumed costless,5 the challengers will
choose it such that in the final stage the incumbent prefers (D,A) to (A,A). This requires6
Pa(A,A)φa(A,A) ≤ Pa(D,A)φa(D,A) (5)
Substituting for Pa(D,A) and Pa(A,A) from (1) and solving for t = t1(ea) say, the chal-
lengers’ differentiation is given by
t ≤ t1(ea) =
(ea + eb)[φa(D,A)− φa(A,A)]
φa(A,A)
(6)
This choice will block (A,A) as a possible third stage equilibrium leaving only two possi-
bilities (D,A) and (D,D).
Suppose the challengers prefer (D,A) in the third stage, then they will choose t to:
max
{t}
φb (D,A)Pb (D,A) = φb (D,A)
t+ eb
t+ eb + ea
5 In section 4, we relax this assumption.
6We assume in the case of equal payoffs that players prefer defence to attack and ‘give peace a chance’.
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subject to (6). Since the payoff is increasing in t, (6) must bind and t = t1(ea) is optimal
if (D,A) is chosen.




t+ eb + ea
≤ sb








below which challengers prefer (D,D) to (D,A). Taking these results together we have:
Proposition 1. There are only two candidates for unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
in stage 3 of the conflict game: (D,A) and (D,D). Given ea, the challengers will induce
(D,A) and block (A,A) by choosing a level of differentiation t = t1(ea) iff t1(ea) > t2(ea)
where functions t1(ea) and t2(ea) are given by (6) and (7) respectively. If this condition
is not satisfied (i.e., iff t1(ea) ≤ t2(ea)) the challengers will induce the peace equilibrium
(D,D).












(φb(D,A)− sb)φa(D,A) ≤ or > φa(A,A)φb(D,A) (9)
Case 1: Equilibria (D,A) and (D,D) are feasible.





(φb(D,A)− sb)φa(D,A) < φa(A,A)φb(D,A) (10)
At the intersection t1(ea) = t2(ea) incumbent effort, decided at stage 1, is ea = e∗a say,
where
e∗a =
ebφa (D,A) (φb(D,A)− sb)
φb(D,A)φa (A,A)− (φb(D,A)− sb)φa (D,A)
(11)
Condition (10) ensures that e∗a ∈ (0,∞). If ea ≥ e∗a, then t1(ea) ≤ t2(ea) resulting in
peace (D,D), so the challengers attacks are deterred. If ea < e∗a then t1(ea) > t2(ea)
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and (D,A) is induced. Suppose the costs of conflict in equilibrium (D,A) are the same
for both players (φa(D,A) = φb(D,A)). Then if the cost of conflict to the challengers
(1 − φb(D,A)) falls; and/or their status quo payoff sb falls; and/or the cost of mutual
attack to the incumbent (1 − φa(A,A)) rises; then e∗a rises. This makes attaining peace
more costly to the incumbent: more effort is required to induce it. Figure 1 illustrates
this case.
Case 2: Only equilibrium (D,A) is feasible.
In this case (10) no longer holds. If (φb(D,A) − sb)φa(D,A) = φa(A,A)φb(D,A) then
the t1(ea) and t2(ea) curves are parallel and e∗a = ∞. If (φb(D,A) − sb)φa(D,A) >
φa(A,A)φb(D,A) the curves intersect at e∗a < 0 as illustrated in Fig. 2. In both cases,
there is no level of effort by the incumbent that can induce (D,D). If the incentives for the
challenger to attack are high because of a sufficiently low cost of conflict and a low payoff
at the status quo, and there is a low incentive for the incumbent to engage in all-out-attack
(A,A), then the peace equilibrium (D,D) is not feasible.
Summarizing these results we have:
Proposition 2. If condition (10) holds then there exists a threshold level of effort by the
incumbent e∗a given by (11) such that for ea < e∗a equilibrium (D,A) is induced at stage 3,
whilst for ea ≥ e∗a it is the peace equilibrium (D,D) that is induced. If (10) does not hold
then (D,D) is unfeasible and only one equilibrium (D,A) is possible at stage 3.
With differentiation, peace may not be possible. If peace is possible, there is a thresh-
old level of incumbent effort below which attack is induced. Above this threshold, the
challengers are deterred and peace results.
3.3 Stage 1: Choice of effort by incumbent
Through its choice of effort, the incumbent determines which of the two remaining candi-
dates, (D,D) and (D,A), emerges as the unique equilibrium in stage 3. The incumbent
can induce the peace equilibrium (D,D) by choosing ea ≥ e∗a in case 1 but only (D,A) is




EUa(D,A) = φa(D,A)Pa(D,A)− C(ea) (12)
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subject to ea < e∗a. Substituting for Pa(D,A) from (1), and putting t = t1(ea), the optimal





− Ca (ea) . (13)
which is equal to the incumbent’s expected utility if (A,A) was the equilibrium. This is
because the incumbent anticipates that in the following stage the challengers will choose
the degree of differentiation that just makes the incumbent prefer (D,A) to (A,A) .
The first order condition for an internal solution, which implicitly defines the optimal








Now suppose the incumbent chooses to induce (D,D) which is only possible in case
1. This is achieved by setting ea = e∗a, the level just sufficient to deter attack at stage 3.
Since effort is costly no more effort will be exerted. The payoff in this equilibrium is given
by
EUa(D,D) = sa − Ca(e∗a) (15)
which should be compared to that in (D,A) given by (13) with ea = e(D,A)a < e∗a.
Finally, note that if there is no internal solution in (13) e(D,A)a will be set just below e∗a.
3.3.1 Comparison with the no-differentiation case
We now compare the results above with those where differentiation is not possible and














Since by assumption (b), φa (D,A) > φa (A,A), comparison of (14) and (16) gives:
Proposition 3. If the incumbent prefers (D,A), when the challengers can differentiate,








With differentiation, the effectiveness of effort is reduced, military expenditure provides
less security, so the incumbent spends less on it.
Now consider the possibility of peace. In order to induce (D,D) with no differentiation,










≥ eb (φb(D,A)− sb)sb
> 0 (17)
Given that sb < φb (D,A), by assumption (d), some effort will be required to ensure this.






















Proposition 4. If, in case 1, the incumbent prefers (D,D), when the challengers can
differentiate, the outcome is a higher level of effort by the incumbent than when the chal-





. In case 2, (D,D) is feasible only without
differentiation.
If, with differentiation, the incumbent can set its effort to implement peace (i.e., case
1), this level of effort will be larger than the level required to implement peace in the
no-differentiation case. Because the challengers have more incentive to attack when they
can differentiate, the incumbent has to expend more effort to deter attack.
3.3.2 The incumbent’s decision to induce (D,D) or (D,A)
This choice is only relevant to case 1, since in case 2 (D,D) is not feasible. The incum-















> Ca(e(D,D)a )− Ca(e(D,A)a ) (19)
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The left-hand-side of (19) gives the benefits of the status quo relative to a share of the
prize following mutual attack. If we impose a further assumption (e) that the incumbent’s
share of resources is higher in peace than with defensive attack; i.e.,
sa > φa(D,A) (20)
then these benefits are positive since the above, together with assumption (b), implies




< 1. The right-hand-side of (19) gives the costs to the
incumbent of inducing peace, which are positive since e(D,D)a > e(D,A)a for conflict to be
feasible. The incumbent’s decision depends on the interplay between these benefits and
costs (in particular on whether (20) holds) and the opportunity cost of effort Ca(ea). Note
that, if sa > φa(D,A) a necessary condition for the incumbent to prefer conflict will be
that there is an internal solution for e(D,A)a , since otherwise the difference between the cost
of peace and conflict will tend to zero.
We now consider whether the challengers ability to differentiate increases or decreases
the prospects of peace (D,D). We know in case 2 that differentiation may make peace
impossible, as shown in Figure 3. In case 1, the analysis is more complex. Starting
from a situation in which there is no-differentiation and the incumbent prefers to induce
peace. Allowing differentiation means that it takes the incumbent more effort to deter





< e(D,D)a . Differentiation
also reduces the incumbent’s incentive to cut its effort to just above the level that would





. It is, therefore, more
likely that an internal solution for e(D,A)a is achieved with differentiation. As was the
case when sa > φa(D,A), a necessary condition for the incumbent to prefer conflict is an
internal solution for e(D,A)a .
Starting from peace the introduction of the ability to differentiate may result in conflict.
In general however, the impact of differentiation on the possibility of peace is ambiguous.
Although the cost of inducing peace (the right hand side of (19)) rises with differentiation,
so does the relative benefit of peace (the left hand side of (19)). The quantitative evidence
suggests that differentiation does increase the probability of war. Reiter (1999) finds that
when states differentiate strategy, one adopts maneuver the other attrition, disputes are
much more likely to escalate to war than when both adopt maneuver or both attrition.
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4 The game with fixed costs of differentiation
The previous section analyzed the model with and without differentiation. This section
integrates the two by introducing a fixed cost of differentiation. We assume there is a cost
F of choosing to differentiate (this is similar to set-up costs in location models). For high
F challengers do not differentiate, while for low F they do, and at the switch point there
is a discontinuity in the incumbent payoff. We now proceed to solve the game backwards
using the results from previous sections.
The last stage of the game is unchanged, since by then F is sunk and differentiation,
if any, is a given parameter. In the second stage of the game, the challengers choose
the degree of differentiation t. In previous sections, we obtained the optimal degree of
differentiation, should the challengers decide to differentiate t1. Now, if fixed costs are
sufficiently high, the challengers may not differentiate, even if they expect to attack in
the final stage of the game. The payoff from differentiating is higher than that of not
differentiating (for a given level of the incumbent’s effort) if:
φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=t1 > φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=0 .
Therefore, to persuade the challengers not to differentiate (even when expecting (D,A)),
fixed costs F, need to be bigger than F ∗, defined as:
F ∗ = φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=t1 − φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=0 .
Note that F ∗ is increasing in the incumbent’s effort7.
To ensure that the challengers prefer peace (D,D) , incumbent effort must ensure that
they have no incentive to attack, either with or without differentiation. Therefore, the
peace condition is:
7Substituting for t1,
F ∗ = φb(D,A)ea
(ea + eb)










φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=t1 − F, φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=0
ª
. (21)
The payoff for the challengers if they do not attack needs to be higher than the maximum
of their payoffs when they attack, whether or not they differentiate8. Figure 4 provides
a graphical representation of this condition (21) as a function of incumbent effort9. To
understand Figure 4, note that the two terms in the right hand side of (21) intersect at a
level of incumbent effort which we denote eIa. This effort is zero for zero fixed costs and
increases with F . If the fixed costs were sufficiently high, not differentiating would be
better for the challengers, irrespective of effort levels (see Appendix for details).
The incumbent effort which makes the challengers indifferent between differentiating
or not eIa, is a new parameter which results from the fixed cost of differentiation. As long
as this cost is positive, it may be possible for the incumbent to prevent differentiation, even
if conflict cannot be prevented. This level of effort connects with the analysis of previous
section, as it introduces a discontinuity point in the conflict payoff for the incumbent, which
jumps from the differentiation payoff to the non-differentiation payoff if the incumbent’s
effort falls bellow eIa (see for instance, bottom graph in Fig. 5).
Thus we have:
Proposition 5. Increases in fixed differentiation costs F will reduce the level of conflict-








Figure 4 illustrates this proposition. It shows the minimum level of incumbent effort
required to prevent conflict e(D,D)a , for a given peacetime payoff for the challengers sb. It
also shows the impact of an increase in the fixed cost from, F = 0 to F = bF, which is
the fixed cost that makes the conflict preventing effort with and without differentiation
coincide.
In order to understand the above result note that:
8Note that if φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=t1 − F > φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=0 , the challengers will differentiate
only if sb < φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=t1 −F. Otherwise, they will not differentiate and therefore, there will be
no conflict, even if sb < φb (D,A) [Pb (D,A)]t=t1 .
9For clarity we use linear functions to represent terms 1 and 2 of the right hand side of the conflict
preventing condition. In fact, they are convex in the incumbent’s effort.
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• First, increases in F , starting at F = 0, will reduce the differentiation payoff of the
challengers, therefore causing downward shifts to the function represented by the
first term of the peace condition. This will reduce the minimal conflict-preventing
effort e(D,D)a (since conflict now becomes a relatively less attractive option for the
challengers) until the shift reaches the intersection between the other two functions:
the non differentiation conflict payoff and the peace payoff sb. This will happen at
a cost level which we denote bF.
• Second, if F > bF , the conflict-preventing effort will coincide with the one obtained





. Therefore, increases in F beyond bF
will not affect the level of conflict-preventing effort.
Having analyzed the condition for incumbent effort to prevent conflict, we now analyze
the impact of F on optimal incumbent effort should it decide not to prevent conflict. In
finding the optimal effort, we must take account of the fact that the incumbent’s payoff
function is likely to be discontinuous when (D,A) is preferred. Figs 5 and 6, show the
incumbent’s expected payoff functions when the (D,A) equilibrium is expected, for both
the differentiation and no differentiation cases (analyzed in previous sections). With fixed
costs, the relevant expected payoff function is now shown by the thicker discontinuous
curves, where the point of discontinuity is the incumbent’s level of effort at which the
first and second terms in condition (21) intersect, eIa. Higher levels of effort will make the
challengers prefer to differentiate and therefore the payoff with differentiation becomes the
relevant one, but when F is big enough, differentiation will not occur even when conflict
is expected. This situation is shown in Fig. 5, which corresponds to our earlier analysis
without differentiation. If the fixed cost of effort F is sufficiently low, however, the optimal
level of defensive effort e(D,A)a will not prevent differentiation from taking place, as shown
in Fig. 6. Finally, it is worth noting that starting from a sufficiently high F, decreases in
F can force a reduction in the optimal defensive effort which follow eIa and do not induce
differentiation. However, as illustrated in Fig. 7, there will be a point where attempts to
prevent differentiation stop and the effort level will jump up to the optimal differentiation
effort level analyzed in previous sections. Further decreases in F will then have no impact
on the optimal defensive effort e(D,A)a . We can summarize the discussion in the following
proposition:
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Proposition 6. In the presence of fixed differentiation costs, it may be better for the
incumbent to reduce defensive effort in order to discourage differentiation. The choice for
the incumbent will be between preventing conflict by deterring attack or defending against
an attack without differentiation. However, if differentiation costs are low enough, the
choice, as in the case without fixed differentiation costs, will be between preventing conflict
by sufficient effort or defending against an attack with differentiation.
Finally consider the impact of decreases in F on the chance of peace. Starting from
peace, easier differentiation (lower F ) increases the chance that the necessary condition
for conflict, under the assumption sa > φa(D,A), will be satisfied, e
(D,A)
a < e(D,D)a . There
is, however, one point at which decreases in F force an upward jump in effort, when the
incumbent gives up preventing differentiation. After that, the incumbent’s expected payoff
is not affected by F, though F continues to affect the peace payoff negatively until eIa = 0.
Also, as shown above, peace may not be feasible, below a critical value of F .
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a simple model of asymmetric conflict in which big guy,
the incumbent, makes a choice to which it becomes locked in, while the little guys, the chal-
lengers, can choose to differentiate their technology or tactics to exploit the incumbent’s
vulnerabilities. Although simple, this idea describes a number of interesting military,
commercial, and legal conflicts. It explains how the possibility of differentiation can give
the little guys an edge and can increase their probability of winning should they attack.
Without differentiation the incumbent can always deter the challengers by sufficient ef-
fort, but with differentiation attack may be inevitable and deterrence may be impossible,
whatever the incumbent’s investment in effort. In addition, since differentiation reduces
the effectiveness of the incumbent’s effort if conflict comes, the incumbent’s effort will be
lower with differentiation than without it.
The ability to differentiate has important implications for incumbents as it suggests
they now face a difficult dilemma, the more effort they invest, the more incentive the
challengers have to differentiate and so they can easily push the challengers to adopt more
dangerous tactics against them. But the challengers have to limit differentiation to avoid
provoking too damaging a retaliation. These results seem consistent with the some of
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the existing empirical literature on the analysis of the causes of conflict, e.g. see Reiter
(1999). They also seem consistent with the pattern of nuclear proliferation. In the early
1960s many predicted 25 to 30 states with nuclear weapons by 2000. This did not happen
because many states capable of building nuclear weapons, decided that it would be too
provocative. Kase (2001) discusses a 1968/70 Japanese report that concluded that it would
be unwise for Japan to develop nuclear weapons because to do so would alarm not only
China, but also the US and USSR and leave Japan vulnerable to a nuclear attack. For
isolated states, like Israel and South Africa, the calculations were quite different. Garcia-
Alonso and Smith (2005) discuss this case in more detail.
Our model has a number of policy implications. The incumbent can make differenti-
ation less likely if it can increase the fixed costs of differentiation, e.g. through controls
on the diffusion of particular technologies. Nevertheless, the potential for differentiation
means that any dominant power, is not necessarily safe from challengers and it increases
the need for non military methods to achieve peace. Non-military incentives are discussed
in more detail by Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Bernholz (2004). In the context of
our model, the non-military methods correspond to changing the peacetime shares or
perceived costs of conflict, which we have treated as exogenous. In many cases, if the
incumbent could credibly pre-commit to increase the peace-time shares of the challengers,
it would wish to do so, as this would be cheaper than either the effort required to deter
the challengers or the cost of conflict. Real conflicts are often protracted because neither
side believes the other’s promises and it often takes a third party guarantor to resolve the
conflict. Such guarantors may be hard to find.
An important parameter in our model is the perceived costs of conflict, changes to this
parameter may also change the chances of peace. As already mentioned, a recent empirical
literature analyzes the determinants of the costs of conflict, interestingly they prove that
it is richer countries with a lower cost of terrorist attacks which are more prone to suffering
these attacks (see Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004), this seems consistent with our
model.
Sandler and Enders (2004) suggest that a possible way to counteract terrorist attacks
using differentiation is to follow the differentiation path of the challenger, however, they
also argue (see also Enders and Sandler (1993)) that, in the face of this terrorists simply
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tend to differentiate again (different target or different tactic). In our paper, we keep the
technological choice of the incumbents as fixed.
Although the model is simple, the calculations the contestants are required to make
are quite complicated and depend on their ability to evaluate the probabilities and the
costs of conflict to their opponent. We have assumed that contestants have complete
information about all probabilities and payoffs, but our results are quite fragile. The
optimum effort or differentiation is often a boundary solution; e.g. if the challengers
decide to attack, they will set differentiation at just the level where the incumbent is
indifferent between defending and attacking. In such cases, small errors of calculation can
cause catastrophe for either side. This is, however, a realistic feature of such conflicts:
big decisions turn on difficult calculations about the opponents expected payoff and the
model brings this out. Once one allows for asymmetric information, issues of signalling
become important. A number of papers within the terrorism literature have used models
of incomplete information. Lapan and Sandler (1993) and Overgaard (1994) present an
attack by a terrorist group as a signal of the terrorist effort. The introduction of such type
of asymmetric information in our model could be an interesting future line of research.
We have imposed a number of assumptions on the cost of conflict, which defined the
asymmetric warfare game. But one could look at other games and ask, for instance, under
what circumstances would an incumbent want to attack a non-threatening challenger. Our
model provides a way to address that question. Essentially, powerful incumbents never feel
safe, because they do not know how the little guys will attack them, therefore they may be
pre-disposed to take any action that may negate the threat. In our model, the contestants
decide to attack or defend simultaneously, we think this is a realistic representation, since
in reality neither side can guarantee to get their retaliation in first. However, the fact
that we have a one shot static game is a restrictive assumption. Allowing for a dynamic
game with multiple interaction between parties would introduce the possibility of cycles:
the challengers displace the incumbents, become the new incumbents and are themselves
challenged. Also, in a dynamic context one could study the possibility that the perceived
costs of conflict, which we take as exogenous, may vary and therefore, affect the chances of
peace. Another simplifying assumption in our model is that we do not allow for a defensive
advantage on the side of the defensive party, our purpose was to keep the model reasonably
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simple, our results would still stand if we introduced a small defensive advantage. Finally,
unlike Sandler and Enders (2004), our model only has one incumbent and therefore, we do
not analyze possible benefits to incumbents who face common contestants to coordinate
the design of their policies.
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Appendix 1: Graphical representation of peace condition with fixed costs.




φa (D,A) (ea + eb)− φa (A,A) ea
φa (D,A) (ea + eb)






























This is zero for zero fixed cost and increases with F .
Note that if
F > φb (D,A)
φa (D,A)− φa (A,A)
φa (D,A)
,
not differentiating would always be better for the challengers.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 5.
First, note that increases in F , starting at F = 0, will cause downward shifts to the
function represented by the first term of the peace condition (21). This will reduce the
minimal conflict-preventing effort e(D,D)a , until the shift reaches the intersection between
the other two functions: the second term of the of the peace condition and sb. This






where, substituting for eIa we get
sb =
φb (D,A) [φa (D,A)− φa (A,A)]− φa (D,A)F
φa (D,A)− φa (A,A)
⇐⇒
bF = (φa (D,A)− φa (A,A))φa (D,A) [φb (D,A)− sb] .
Any increase in F within the
h
0, bFi interval will cause the conflict-preventing effort
e(D,D)a to decrease. The conflict-preventing condition in that interval must ensure:
sb ≥ φb(D,A)
φa (D,A) (ea + eb)− φa (A,A) ea




ebφa (D,A) (φb(D,A)− sb − F )
φb(D,A)φa (A,A)− (φb(D,A)− sb)φa (D,A) + Fφa (D,A)
which is clearly decreasing in F .
Second, if F > bF , the conflict-preventing effort will coincide with the one obtained









Therefore, increases in F beyond bF will not affect the level of conflict-preventing effort.
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Figure 2: Large φb (D,A)− sb.
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Figure 4: Impact on the conflict preventing level of effort of an increase in fixed costs of
differentiation (from F = 0 to F = bF ).
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Figure 5: Thicker discontinuous curve represents the expected payoff for the incumbent
for high F if defensive conflict is expected.
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Figure 6: Thicker discontinuous curve represents the expected payoff for the incumbent
for low F if defensive conflict is expected.
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Figure 7: Impact on e(D,A)a and e(D,D)a of a decrease in F.
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